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Abstract 
The post-Cold-War transformation of Central and Eastern Europe involved a complex 
reconfiguration of existing collective identifications, territorial attachments and borders, 
which included both establishing new attachments and borders and dispensing with the old 
ones. This article traces this reconfiguration by looking at the case of Slovenia. After briefly 
sketching the transformation of symbolic attachments and borders during the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia, the article analyses the appropriations of this new symbolic mapping in the public 
debates and immigration and citizenship policies related to the two major instances of 
immigration in Slovenia after the establishment of an independent Slovenian state in 1991: 
the arrival of Bosnian war refugees in 1992, and the increase in undocumented immigration in 
2000-2001. Particular attention is paid to the conceptualisation of borders, especially the 
relationships between symbolic and institutionalised borders. It is argued that state borders are 
far from being the sole institutional vehicle of the symbolic borders separating the Self from 
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its Others. Policy measures regulating immigration function as an additional vehicle for these 
borders, and thus provide a complement to the institution of state borders: if the state border 
marks the perceived territorial borders of the Self, the immigration-related policy measures 
serve to maintain the perceived population borders distinguishing the Self from its Other(s).  
 
<<Please include one or more maps, to geographical position the paper>> 
 
Introduction 
 
As several works published over the course of the past few decades have demonstrated, 
virtually all of the European societies have a centuries-long record of constructing Europe as a 
spatial and socio-cultural entity starkly opposed to those parts of the world which are 
conceived as non-European or at least not sufficiently European: the Orient, Africa, Eastern 
Europe, the Balkans etc. (Said 1978; Wolff 1994; Delanty 1995, 1996; Lewis and Wigen 
1997; Todorova 1997). While the majority of these studies focussed almost exclusively on the 
ways Western European authors imagine the Balkans and the East, some scholars have 
pointed to the fact that these symbolic geographies are far from being an exclusively Western 
European product. Instead, they are often (re-)produced locally, within the despised regions 
themselves, whose inhabitants tend to internalise the categories applied to them by their 
Western observers, or use them to distinguish themselves from inhabitants of neighbouring 
states (Gal 1991; Bakić-Hayden and Hayden 1992, Norris 1999; Iordanova 2001; Bjelić and 
Savić 2002; Patterson 2003; Kuus 2004; Lindstrom and Rasza 2004). 
Yet unlike the old EU member states such as Germany, Britain and Denmark, which seem to 
be propelled towards Europe mainly via a number of negations (Hedetoft 1995: 527-581), and 
to which Europe offers only “an indirect avenue towards national identity confirmation” 
(579), the Central and Eastern European states are characterized by a much more affective, 
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positive involvement with European issues. For states such as Hungary, Poland or Slovenia, 
belonging to Europe was, years before actually joining the EU, a crucial positive element of 
national identification. The transformation following the collapse of the Cold War 
arrangement of the world was often framed as a journey ‘back to Europe’, and joining the EU 
symbolised the ultimate station of this journey (Henderson 1999). Each of the nations 
presented itself as fundamentally European; a long-lost child of Europe who, after decades of 
Soviet or Yugoslav domination, was finally re-joining the ‘common home’ of Europe.  
This marked emphasis on belonging to Europe is hardly surprising. Unlike the Northern, 
Southern and Western borders of Europe, which follow the coastline and are thus fairly 
unambiguous, the Eastern and Southeastern borders are notorious for their malleability and 
multiplicity (Connor 1994 [1969]; Wolff 1994; Lewis and Wigen 1997; Todorova 1997). Due 
to that, in regions positioned to the East and Southeast of Europe, belonging to Europe is not 
necessarily an obvious choice. Over the course of time, these regions have often been seen as 
cleaving to other spatial units, for example Asia or the Balkans.  
Thus, the assertion of belonging to Europe should not be seen simply as a description of the 
real position of these countries, but rather as a wishful projection that was itself involved in 
shifting the borders of Europe eastwards and southwards. Or, to put it differently, the East and 
Central European countries and nations were in fact stretching the external borders of Europe 
to include themselves (Mihelj 2004b), thereby also delineating themselves from their 
immediate neighbours whom they perceived as not sufficiently European. Therefore, the post-
Cold-War transformation of Central and Eastern Europe involved a complex reconfiguration 
of existing collective identifications, territorial attachments and borders, which included both 
establishing new attachments and borders and dispensing with the old ones.  
This article traces this reconfiguration by looking at a specific case, namely the case of 
Slovenia – the only part of the former Yugoslav federation that joined the EU in 2004. It starts 
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by discussing the conceptualisation of borders, focussing in particular on the relationships 
between symbolic and institutionalised borders, and arguing that a full examination of border-
making mechanisms should take into account not only the discursive construction of 
collective identity and borders and the actual functioning of the state frontiers, but also the 
various citizenship and immigration laws, related policy measures and discourses which 
justify them. After briefly sketching the transformation of symbolic attachments and borders 
during the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the article analyses the appropriations of this new 
symbolic mapping in the public debates and immigration and citizenship policies related to 
the two major instances of immigration in Slovenia after the establishment of an independent 
Slovenian state in 1991: the arrival of Bosnian war refugees in 1992, and the increase in 
undocumented immigration in 2000-2001.  
The interpretation presented in the following sections builds upon existing analyses of 
Slovenian immigration policies and public discourses on immigration (Doupona Horvat et al. 
2001 [1996]; Jalušič 2001; Kuhar 2001; Bassin et al. 2002 and others), and combines them 
with an analysis of symbolic geography underpinning the mass media coverage of Bosnian 
refugees in 1992 and undocumented immigration in 2000 and 2001. The sample of analysed 
materials consists of newspaper articles published in the main periodical press (the dailies 
Delo, Večer, Dnevnik, Slovenske novice, Slovenec and Republika and the weeklies Mladina, 
Mag and Primorske novice), as well as the daily TV news bulletins (TV Dnevnik, Odmevi), 
weekly information programs (e.g. Refugees here with Us, Tednik) and documentaries (e.g. 
Persona non grata, Refugees-Illegal Foreigners) produced by the first TV channel (TVS1) of 
the public broadcasting service Radio-Television Slovenia.  
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The analysis presented in the paper is, for the most part, limited to the examination of 
manifest uses of symbolic geography appearing in the media coverage.3 The first step 
involved a search for all the occurrences of nouns and adjectives referring to geographical 
regions and territories (e.g. Europe, European, the South, Southern etc.) and other words 
based on such geographical categories (e.g. the Southerners). Then followed the identification 
of all those cases where these nouns, adjectives and other words referring to geographical 
regions and territories were associated with specific characteristics and values (e.g. violence/ 
peacefulness, democracy/ dictatorship, rate of development etc.). Particular attention was paid 
to the similarities with various types of discourses involving symbolic geographies, especially 
the discourse of Balkanism (Todorova 1997) and the discourse of Frontier Orientalism 
(Gingrich 1998). Finally, the main part of the analysis involved an examination of how these 
words were used to frame the relationship between refugees and undocumented immigrants 
on the one hand and Slovenia and Slovenians on the other hand. This involved raising 
questions such as: Were the refugees and immigrants seen as equally European or Western as 
Slovenians? How was Slovenia’s link with Europe used to justify the introduction of 
particular policy measures related to refugees and undocumented immigration?  
 
 
Symbolic and Institutionalised Borders 
 
The construction of the Other and the closely related creation of borders are widely 
acknowledged and explored aspects of national identity formation and of the construction of 
other forms of collective identity (Barthes 1969; Cohen 1985). It has also been recognized 
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that the borders of the national Self are often enshrined in laws and institutionalised in the 
form of state borders. Borders between states can therefore be seen not merely as physical, 
empirical lines that appear on maps; they are also “social, cultural and political constructs that 
are made meaningful and exploited by human beings as part of the institutionalization 
processes of territories” (Paasi 2004: 22). Or, as Malcolm Anderson (1996: 2) argued: state 
frontiers should not be regarded only as institutions, but also as “markers of identity”, that 
form a “part of political beliefs and myths about the unity of the people, and sometimes myths 
about the ‘natural’ unity of a territory”. 
Symbolic borders of particular communities, however, are institutionalised not only in the 
form of state frontiers, but also in the form of citizenship and immigration laws. This is hardly 
surprising. Within the classical model of the state, the state territory is assumed to be 
congruent with a territorially bounded population (see e.g. Bendix 1964). The state thus needs 
to be treated not only as a territorial organisation, but also as a membership organisation, i.e. 
an association of citizens (Brubaker 1992: 22). In line with that, state frontiers should not be 
treated merely as borders delimiting state territories but also as borders delimiting the 
populations of these states. And as populations are not – contrary to much of the popular 
nationalist imagery – physically rooted in particular state territories, laws regulating the 
control of state borders need to be complemented by laws distinguishing those who have free 
access to the territory from those who do not – i.e. laws governing citizenship and 
immigration. Indeed, as Malcolm Anderson (1996: 149) argues, state frontiers “have always 
had the general purpose of controlling or preventing the movement of people”; they have been 
established to prevent what are perceived as ‘intrusions’ of foreign populations. 
It could be argued that together, the state borders and laws regulating citizenship and 
immigration, serve to perpetuate and reify a specific “sedentarist metaphysics” (Malkki 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Mihelj 2004b). 
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1997). Within this metaphysics, peoples and cultures are conceived as being rooted in a 
particular territory (‘national soil’) and thus unavoidably bound to live a sedentary life, while 
any migration outside the national territory is described in terms of uprootedness, treated as 
an aberration, and associated with the loss of identity, if not morality. However, with the 
development of new communication technologies and the ensuing intensification of cross-
border communication between emigrants and their home countries, strong ties with family 
members and friends and their way of life are increasingly easy to maintain. It is becoming 
more and more obvious that culture and identity are not necessarily dependent on the physical 
proximity to a particular territory. Or, as Malcolm Anderson (1996: 7) argued, “a process of 
delocalisation of boundaries may now be under way”, and more and more people are, “like 
the ‘wandering Jew’, carrying their identity around with them.”  
This, however, does not mean that the increase in migration and other aspects of globalisation 
diminished the power of borders. The immigrants may not even want to maintain strong ties 
with the country they came from, or may explicitly want to adopt the way of life characteristic 
of their new home environment – yet cannot escape being treated as fundamentally different 
and belonging somewhere else. While the state frontiers may have become more permeable 
and have ceased to function as primary markers of collective identity, other forms of 
collective borders and jurisdictional devices have taken over their role (Cohen 1998: 33). In a 
context of increased migration, it is precisely citizenship and immigration laws, not state 
frontiers, that become the fundamental institutional vehicles of symbolic borders, and with 
that also of collective identities. A full examination of border-making mechanisms in the 
contemporary processes of European integration should therefore take into account not only 
the functioning of the state borders of Europe, but also the various citizenship and 
immigration laws and related institutions and policy measures. All of them can function as 
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institutional vehicles of symbolic borders, and become infused with various symbolic images 
of the Self and the Other.   
 
 
The Reconfiguration of Borders during the Disintegration of Yugoslavia 
 
In the course of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars, the existing 
network of collective identifications, including collective memories and collective 
attachments to space, changed substantially. Before the 1980s, the symbolic divisions of 
Yugoslavia into its Western and Eastern (or, even more often, Northern and Southern) parts 
were not seen as insurmountable. Each republic and province was seen as an integral part of 
Yugoslavia, and thus as a component of a compact spatial and cultural unit which, albeit 
internally diverse, actually shared a recognizable common identity: it was neither Western nor 
Eastern. The positioning of Yugoslavia as neither-Western-nor-Eastern penetrated various 
levels of public discourses in the federation. Different spheres of Yugoslav culture, politics 
and society were envisaged in terms of their proximity and distance to both East and West. 
Particularly with the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s, the neither-
Eastern-nor-Western positioning became one of the central elements of the socialist Yugoslav 
political identity and one of the defining traits of the Yugoslav foreign policy (Petković 
1986). Furthermore, the distinguishing feature of socialist Yugoslav economy (in the official 
jargon: self-management), in which the business was run in the form of cooperatives in which 
employees shared profit and took part in the management, was thought of as an economy 
combining elements of both the Soviet (i.e. Eastern) economic statism as well as the Western 
free market economy (cf. Sirc 1979).  
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In the late 1980s, this particular positioning, coupled with the image of Yugoslavia as 
characterized by a unity-in-diversity, gradually lost its hegemonic status.  Especially in 
Slovenia and Croatia, the internal diversity of Yugoslavia ceased to function as a source of 
pride. Instead, it was increasingly seen as an obstacle to further development. Yugoslavia 
began to be perceived as an unviable mixture of incompatible civilisations or cultures: the 
Western and the Eastern one, the European and the Balkan one. This change crucially affected 
the particular national identifications and attachments to space, and contributed to a major 
reshuffling of symbolic borders. According to Milica Bakić-Hayden (1995: 927), the 
existence of the Yugoslav framework effectively neutralised the usual valorisation of 
traditional dichotomies such as East/West, Europe/Asia, Europe/Balkans etc. With the 
destruction of this neutralising framework, however, these categories were re-evaluated and 
began to be perceived as opposites rather than simply differences, which “has resulted in the 
destruction of the living communities that transcended them”. 
In this process, ‘Europe’ began to be used as a symbol of civilisation and development. Most 
politicians, intellectuals and journalists would claim Slovenia to be more civilised, developed 
and progressive—and thus more European—than the rest of Yugoslavia. According to the 
foreign minister Dimitrij Rupel, for example, Slovenians were actually a major factor in the 
Europeanization of the Yugoslav state (Delo, 18/12/1990). Such a symbolic positioning of 
Slovenia was also used to justify the claim for independent statehood. To secure and protect 
its higher level of development and civilisation, it was argued, Slovenia should embark on the 
process of further Europeanization as a fully sovereign nation-state.  
By contrast, the prospect of Slovenia remaining an integral part of Yugoslavia was repeatedly 
pictured as detrimental to Slovenia’s prosperity.  The president of the Slovenian Assembly 
France Bučar, for example, argued that the failure to achieve full independence would 
actually mean a “Yugoslavisation of Slovenia”, and that “with that, the right road we have 
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taken in our republic would be blocked” (Daily News Bulletin, TV Slovenia 1, 16/11/1990). 
The Slovenian Christian Democrats were even more explicit; as they argued in their appeal to 
the public launched shortly before the plebiscite for an independent Slovenia in 1990, the 
Slovenian government “could only stop the intrusion of the Balkan violence into our lands, 
and the ever-more greedy robbing of our hard-earned financial means, by taking the matters 
into its own hands, as dictated by the interests of Slovenia as an independent unit” (Delo, 
11/12/1990). The common Yugoslav space came to be equated with underdevelopment, 
barbarism, disorder, decay and violence, thus assuming the characteristics usually ascribed to 
the Balkans or Eastern Europe (Wolff 1994; Todorova 1997).  
 
 
The New Symbolic Mapping of Slovenia as a Frame for the Issue of Immigration 
 
The symbolic mapping of Slovenia as developed, progressive and ‘European’, and the rest of 
Yugoslavia as underdeveloped, barbarian, and ‘Balkan’, persisted throughout the period of the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia and the formation of Slovenia as an independent state. The 
southern border of Slovenia, proclaimed as an international border by the Slovenian 
authorities in 1991, and recognised as such by the international community in 1992, thus also 
became a border which – at least in the eyes of the Slovenian population – symbolically 
separated Europe from non-Europe (Zavratnik-Zimic 2001: 76-78). Apart from framing the 
relationships between the different Yugoslav republics and provinces during the disintegration 
of the federation, this new symbolic geography also served as a frame for a number of other 
foreign and domestic issues, including various forms of cross-border migration.  
Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communist regimes, undocumented 
immigration, predominantly originating in Eastern and Southeastern Europe and the Middle 
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East, has been one of the major issues on the political agendas in many European societies. 
Among other things, the immigrants have become targets of a new kind of moral panic 
(Husbands 1994); they have been charged with abusing the welfare state, committing crimes 
and ‘stealing’ jobs from established citizens (Koser and Lutz 1998: 3). Perceived in such a 
way, immigrants have easily become objects of nationalist and racist hatred (Stolcke 1995; 
Tesfahuney 1998), and have regularly been used as a negative screen to crystallise a positive 
self-identity of receiving societies (cf. Cohen 1994). In Slovenia, undocumented immigration 
from other formerly communist states and the Middle East entered the public discussion 
somewhat later than in Western Europe, yet the dominant representations of the issue have 
been similarly biased and underpinned by nationalism and racism. Just as elsewhere in 
Europe, the media have used the representation of immigrants as the Other to frame a 
positive, self-congratulatory image of ‘us’ (Bassin et al. 2002; Drolc 2003; Erjavec 2003; 
Mihelj 2004a). Moreover, the representational strategies used by the Slovenian mass media 
are virtually the same as the ones employed by the mass media in other European states 
(Mihelj, forthcoming).  
However, unlike the case of Western European states, where the immigrants predominantly 
functioned as the mirror image of ‘us’ as a nation, the immigrants entering Slovenia also 
served as the Other for ‘us’ as Europeans. Both in the case of Bosnian refugees and in the 
case of undocumented immigration, Slovenia was symbolically positioned as a part of 
Europe, while everything beyond the Slovenian southern and eastern borders was disparaged 
as a part of the Balkans or the East. One of the main arguments fostered in this analysis is that 
this symbolic positioning played a major role in framing the public attitudes as well as 
political decisions related to immigration, including the introduction of new policy measures. 
The immigrants were not seen only as being fundamentally different from Slovenians as such, 
but also as being different from Slovenians as members of a larger collective of Europeans. 
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Their integration was therefore seen not only as a threat to national homogeneity, but also as a 
threat to the homogeneity of Europe. In fact, various measures adopted vis-à-vis the Bosnian 
refugees, undocumented immigrants and asylum seekers could be interpreted as particular 
institutionalisations of this symbolic geography, more specifically of the border between 
Slovenians—as a part of Europe or the West—and the immigrants—as  a disturbing element 
coming either from the Balkans or from the East. As such, these policy measures can be seen 
as a complement to another form of institutionalisation of the border between Europe and the 
Balkans (or between the West and the East), namely the state border between Slovenia and 
Croatia—currently the southern border of the EU.  
 
 
Case Study I: Bosnian Refugees (1992)  
 
The refugees who came to Slovenia first from Croatia and then, in much larger numbers, from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, were a veritable test of the declared democratic standards 
and respect for human rights in Slovenia. Along with presenting Slovenia as distinctively 
European in terms of culture and civilisation, the Slovenian political elites have regularly 
spoken of Slovenia as uniquely democratic, contrasting its political culture with the 
totalitarian one characteristic of the other formerly Yugoslav republics. However, the 
symbolic mapping that saw Slovenians as inherently more civilised and European than the 
other Yugoslav nations inhibited the full endorsement of equality and human rights. After the 
outbreak of the armed conflicts in Croatia and later in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia first 
adopted a policy of open borders, and several governmental bodies were actively involved in 
setting up refugee centres, securing financial means, and boosting public support. Yet 
alongside with that, the refugees were often pictured as fundamentally different from the 
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Slovenian population, and on several occasions, these differences have been explained by 
reference to geographical categories.  
One of the most explicit examples can be found in a letter tellingly entitled Against the 
Balkanisation of Slovenia (Slovenec, 22/08/1992), written by the president of the Slovenian 
National Party, Zmago Jelinčič. According to Jelinčič, accepting war refugees from Bosnia 
and Croatia or other former co-citizens seeking refuge in Slovenia could only lead to a 
“Balkanisation of our country”. “The South” – another geographical term often used as a tool 
for the exclusion of the non-Slovenians – is, in his view, characterised by “mental, political, 
behavioural, family or sexual patterns” that are clearly distinct from those in Slovenia, and if 
anyone is attracted by them, “he should move out and let the Slovenians tailor their our own 
future”.  
The use of such pompous mapping of Slovenia and Slovenians was, however, neither limited 
to the far-right segment of the political spectrum nor to the right wing or tabloid newspapers. 
A similarly unambiguous framing of Bosnian refugees as ‘Balkan’ could be found, for 
example, in an article published in the major, most widely read Slovenian broadsheet 
newspaper, Delo (11/07/1992). Like the above-mentioned letter, also this article had a title 
that clearly indicated the presence of the Balkanist frame, namely In the Embrace of the 
Balkans. Furthermore, it was replete with negative representations of refugees, explicitly 
presenting them as potential criminals. 
 
Institutionalisation of the Border between Europe and the Balkans 
The representations of Bosnian refugees such as the ones presented above are remarkably 
similar to the representations of the Balkans that were first formed by Western European 
writers in the late 19th century, and permeated much of Western political commentary of the 
post-Cold-War developments in the region. As Maria Todorova (1997) argued, the Balkans 
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tended to be represented as “an incomplete self” or “the structurally despised alter-ego” (18). 
They “served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-
congratulatory image of the ‘European’ and the ‘West’ has been constructed” (188). In a 
similar vein, Bosnian refugees functioned as a repository of the Slovenians’ negative 
characteristics, including the inclination to violence and criminal activities, dirtiness, laziness, 
nationalism and other traits usually ascribed to non-Europeans. Against that image, a positive 
image of the Slovenians as a peaceful, tidy, diligent, democratic, and thus ‘European’ nation 
could be established. Obviously, if the Slovenians were to retain their putatively European 
culture, the mixing of the Slovenian population with populations that were deemed to be 
insufficiently European – including Bosnian refugees – had to be kept at a minimum. Yet if 
Slovenia was to behave as a democratic country observing humanitarian principles, Bosnian 
refugees could not simply be refused the right to enter the state. Instead, several policy 
measures have been introduced – ranging from segregated education to a total closure of 
Slovenian borders after the country’s hosting capacities have been filled. These measures 
have effectively prevented the full integration of the refugees into the Slovenian society. By 
curious twists of argument, they have been presented as uniquely democratic and entirely 
consistent with the European standards. 
The central trait of Slovenia’s refugee policy adopted after the start of the Yugoslav wars was 
the official definition of Bosnian refugees as temporary refugees. Although the notion of 
temporary refugees appeared in the documents issued by the United Nations High 
Commissariat for Refugees (UNHCR) only exceptionally and without a clear, legally defined 
meaning, the Slovenian politicians and representatives of various state bodies used it as if it 
were a well-established category of international legislation (Doupona Horvat et al. 2001 
[1996]: 29). In an interview, Mirjam Škrk, a lecturer at the Faculty of Law, explained that the 
refugees from Bosnia were defined as temporary because of their large numbers and because 
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of their “personal wish” to return home, not to stay and integrate into the Slovenian society 
(Refugees Here with Us, TVS1, 30/08/1992). With such arguments, the temporary status was 
presented as a confirmation of Slovenia’s high humanitarian standard – exemplified in the 
respect for the presumed personal wishes of refugees. However, as Simona Zavratnik-Zimic 
(2003: 199-200) has argued, the classification of all Bosnian refugees as ‘temporary’ fostered 
the treatment of the refugees as a homogeneous group, and precluded a differentiated 
treatment that would be sensitive to the specific circumstances of individual cases. Most 
importantly, the definition of refugees as ‘temporary’ was also used as an excuse to introduce 
a number of measures evidently in contradiction with the standards defined in the 
international agreements on human rights.  
Firstly, the Bosnian refugees were denied the right of free movement. They had to solicit a 
permit to leave the refugee centre, and in some centres, each refugee was limited to only two 
or three such permits per week. Although such an arrangement was a clear violation of 
refugee’s rights as defined in international charters, it was consistently represented by the 
state officials dealing with the refugees and by most of the journalists as something normal. 
Even more, the fact that the refugees were usually granted permission to exit the centres 
whenever they asked was presented as something positive, as a demonstration of the ‘good 
will’ of the Slovenians (Doupona Horvat et al. 2000 [1996]: 32). Moreover, such attitudes 
regularly went hand in hand with the expressions of deep sympathy for refugees’ suffering. 
For example, Damirka Batinić, a journalist of TV Slovenia, was very sympathetic to the 
suffering of the refugees who complained about their life in the centres, and even compared it 
to life in prison (Refugees Here with Us, TVS1, 30 Aug 1992). However, the views of 
refugees were introduced only after an opinion of an expert who argued that the temporary 
status was, in part, a consequence of the refugees’ own wish to return to Bosnia as soon as 
possible. Based on this, Batinić interpreted the complaints of the refugees as a consequence of 
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a misunderstanding, and argued: “All these misunderstandings and unrealistic demands by the 
refugees would not have arisen had somebody explained their status to them at the 
beginning”. Obviously, in Batinić’s eyes, nothing was intrinsically wrong with the definition 
of refugees as ‘temporary’.  
Secondly, the refugees were not allowed to work. The introduction of this measure was 
usually justified by reference to the high rate of unemployment in Slovenia. Yet rather than 
being thought of as a drawback, the prohibition was occasionally represented as a privilege. 
For example, Ante Livić, another journalist working for TV Slovenia, compared the situation 
in Slovenia with the condition in Austria, where the refugees “had to work”. He argued that 
this might be one of the explanations of the fact that the refugees preferred to stay in Slovenia 
rather than go to Austria (cf. Daily News Bulletin, TVS1, 18/05/1992). Such an argument 
clearly supported the stereotype of refugees as lazy and entirely different from the diligent 
Slovenians. 
Finally, Slovenia also introduced educational segregation. The refugee children were not 
allowed to attend classes together with Slovenian children in regular Slovenian schools. 
Instead, special education was provided for them in their mother tongue. Just as the restriction 
of the free movement and the prohibition of work, this measure has also been represented as 
perfectly normal. Since the refugees would sooner or later return to Bosnia, went the 
argument, it was necessary to prepare them for reintegration, thus to preserve their national 
and cultural identity while in Slovenia (Doupona Horvat et al. 2001 [1996]: 32-36). By such a 
twist of argument, even the segregated system of education was presented as a privilege, as 
yet another confirmation of Slovenia’s high democratic standards.  
In sum, all the policy measures discussed above contributed, first and foremost, to the 
physical isolation of refugees from the host society. Taken into account their association with 
the Balkans on the level of representations, these measures also prevented the mixing of the 
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two poles of the Slovenian imagined geography that were thought to be incompatible: the 
Balkans on the one hand and Europe on the other. Therefore, they can be seen as particular 
institutionalisations of the symbolic border that separates Slovenia and Slovenians, as a part 
of Europe, from Bosnians, as a part of the Balkans.   
 
Closing the Borders as a Way of Protecting Europeanness  
Another aspect of public debates that involved symbolic geography focused on who had 
responsibility for helping the refugees. After the representative of the UNHCR expressed the 
wish that Slovenia would keep on treating refugees as a regional issue, several journalists, 
politicians and other publicly known persons in Slovenia protested. The expectations of the 
UNHCR were based on an assumption that was, in their view, entirely unacceptable: namely 
the belief that Slovenia was more responsible for the war in Yugoslavia and its consequences, 
including the war refugees, than other European states. It is important to note that this 
argument was shared not only by explicitly nationalist politicians and likeminded journalists, 
but by virtually every political option represented in the Slovenian Parliament and even by the 
representatives of humanitarian organisations. For example, commenting on the initial 
reactions of Western European states to the Bosnian refugee crisis, the Minister of Internal 
Affairs Igor Bavčar stated: “We cannot allow them to treat us, in reference to the issue of 
refugees, as one of the former Yugoslav republics” (Daily News Bulletin, TVS1, 27/04/1992). 
Opinions expressed by Borut Pahor, a representative of the reformed League of Communists 
in Slovenia, are another case in point. According to him, UNCHR expectations were entirely 
unacceptable, since Slovenia is an entirely sovereign state and has no legal or political 
responsibility for the war in the Balkans. The fact that Slovenia decided to accept the 
refugees, he argued, “should be understood as a sovereign and humanitarian gesture of a state 
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which cannot assume any more responsibility for solving this problem than other European 
states and the international community” (Delo, 06/06/1992).  
The wish to be treated equally as other European states, however, also served as a justification 
for closing the borders to refugees if other European states refused to open theirs. Zoran 
Thaler, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party and a representative of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, mentioned this possibility openly. He argued that “if the influx of refugees 
would continue with such an intensity as in the last days, then finally there would be no other 
option for Slovenia than to behave as its neighbours, who closed their borders and who are 
now, with great difficulties and drop by drop, accepting certain refugees” (Daily News 
Bulletin, TVS1, 18/05/1992). Lev Kreft, a well-known Marxist philosopher and member of 
the reformed Slovenian League of Communists, shared a similar view: “We have to state that 
we are otherwise in favour of open borders; yet if we will be faced with the question of 
whether we belong to Europe or to the Balkans or if the throng of refugees would be stopped 
in Slovenia because the West would not be prepared to accept them, we have to be clear: the 
Berlin Wall will stretch along the Kolpa river4” (Slovenske novice, 18/07/1992). Finally, 
several journalists also eagerly endorsed the argument that Slovenia should not be lumped 
together with other post-Yugoslav states and should thus not be expected to take over a larger 
responsibility for the refugees than other European states. Žarko Hojnik, for example, claimed 
that both Europe and the Slovenians themselves are too little aware of the fact that Slovenia is 
an independent and internationally recognised state, and rhetorically asked: “Why should we 
behave towards the refugees from BiH5 differently than the rest of Europe? Perhaps because 
we once lived in a common state or because this is what they think in the nearby Croatia?” 
(Delo, 29/04/1992). 
                                                 
4 Kolpa is a river running alongside the southern border of Slovenia, separating Slovenia from Croatia. 
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Evidently, the bottom-line of the public discussion about refugee-related policy measures did 
not revolve simply about what the right political decision would be, but rather about 
Slovenia’s position vis-à-vis Europe. The latter was obviously deemed to be more important 
than respect for human rights: if Europe was to adopt policies violating human rights, 
Slovenia should follow its example nevertheless. That Slovenia might, after all, really have a 
closer connection to the rest of the Yugoslav states, and that it might be appropriate for it to 
accept more refugees than the rest of Europe, was out of question. The danger of sliding too 
close to ‘the Balkan tinder-box’ was clearly deemed too high. 
 
 
Case Study II: Undocumented Immigration from the Middle and Far East 
 
Contrary to the arrival of Bosnian war refugees, the sudden increase in undocumented 
immigration from the Middle and Far East caught Slovenia almost entirely unprepared. In 
2000, the number of immigrants found by the police was higher than 35.000, and twice 
exceeded the number of those found in 1999. The number of applicants for asylum rose from 
776 in 1999 to 12.943 in 2000 (Slovenska policija 2002). The number of people 
accommodated in the so-called asylum homes and centres for the removal of foreigners 
around the country far exceeded their capacities. The deficit provoked severe criticism from 
the United Nations Committee against Torture as well as protests among the local population. 
When faced with the arrival of the refugees in the early 1990s, several governmental bodies 
were actively involved in setting up the refugee centres and collecting support from the very 
beginning. By contrast, when confronted with the problem of undocumented immigration, the 
Slovenian government kept avoiding the issue for several months. It was only in response to 
the mounting pressure from non-governmental organisation and rising xenophobia among the 
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population that amendments to the existing immigration and citizenship legislation were 
introduced.  
The major part of the media coverage of undocumented immigration pictured the situation as 
increasingly dramatic, representing the immigrants as a threat to national security and health, 
thus contributing to the construction of immigrants as the Other (Jalušič 2001; Kuhar 2001; 
Bassin et al. 2002; Erjavec 2003). As in the case of Bosnian refugees, undocumented 
immigration from the Middle and Far East was often framed in geographical terms, e.g. 
described with reference to the geographic region from which it originated. However, while 
the symbolic map underpinning the mass media representations of Bosnian refugees 
positioned Slovenia firmly on the side of Europe/the West, and rejected its association with 
the Balkans/the East, the mass media representations of undocumented immigration revealed 
an importantly different symbolic positioning of Slovenia. Firstly, the symbolic map included 
a considerably larger proportion of the globe.  It stretched far beyond the Balkans into the 
Middle and Far East, thereby clearly suggesting that Slovenia is being affected by 
developments of a global scale. Secondly, the Balkans no longer functioned as the main Other 
against which the Slovenian self would be defined. Instead, the role of the Other was taken 
over by ‘the East’, which most often meant the Middle and Far East and only occasionally 
included the Balkans. This development confirms Bojan Baskar’s (2003) thesis that towards 
the end of the 1990s, a general decline of balkanophobic attitudes could be discerned in 
Slovenia. Thirdly, Slovenia was no longer unambiguously represented as an equal part of 
Europe, but rather as a transit-area at Europe’s margins, clearly differentiated from the ‘real’ 
Europe/ the West, i.e. the EU. As one of Delo’s journalists put it: “For the majority of 
foreigners, our country is only a springboard for the departure towards the West rather than a 
destination country where they could live a decent life,” (27/07/2000). And fourthly, besides 
being represented as a transit area, Slovenia was also consistently portrayed as a state that is 
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bound to protect Europe/ the West from the ‘assaults’ of immigrants coming from ‘the East’. 
This was clearly apparent from the choice of metaphors used to describe the country’s role in 
relation to the immigration and Europe. For example, Slovenia was described as “a hall of 
Europe, a security belt and a border gendarme” (Delo Sobotna priloga, 10/06/2000), a 
“migratory sieve for Europe” (Demokracija, 05/10/2000) and as “the last barrier before the 
West” (Nedelo, 28/05/2000). 
 
Institutionalisation of Frontier Orientalism 
Such symbolic positioning was not entirely new. Quite to the contrary, it was very similar to 
the one that could be found in the discourse of “Frontier Orientalism” (Gingrich 1998) – a 
specific local variation of Orientalism established in the 19th century, typical of the regions 
that once belonged to the Habsburg Empire: eastern Austria, Hungary, north-east Italy, and 
Slovenia. This variety of Orientalism was deeply embedded in the particular historical 
narrative and collective self-identifications typical of the 19th century Habsburg Empire. It 
was recognisably Catholic, included both folk and elite cultures, and consisted of the 
recollection and celebration of historical encounters with the Muslim world, usually military 
victories either against Muslims or together with Muslims (123). It was also typically 
supremacist, characterised by the frequent use of military metaphors, and most importantly, it 
“place[d] the home country and its population along an adjacent territorial and military 
borderline which is imbued with a timeless mission” (119).  
The representations of undocumented immigration in Slovenia included several elements 
analogous to those characteristic of Frontier Orientalism. As demonstrated above, Slovenia 
was represented as a country positioned on the European frontiers and as such performed a 
specific mission, namely the protection of Europe against immigration. Furthermore, military 
metaphors permeated the media reports.  The efforts of the border police were described as a 
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‘struggle against illegal migration’ (cf. Delo, 03/06/2000; 11/08/2000; Večer, 30/12/2000), the 
coming of the immigrants was labelled as an ‘assault’ (Delo, 19/072000; Dnevnik, 
27/07/2000), and various activities undertaken by the police were referred to as ‘operations’ 
(Delo, 01/10/2001). And thirdly, the immigrants would sometimes be explicitly associated 
with Islam or seen as a modern variation of the Ottoman invasions. For example, 
undocumented immigration was sometimes referred to as “the contemporary Turkish 
invasion” (29/01/2001), while the roadblocks and night watches organised to prevent the state 
officials from accommodating the immigrants in one of the Slovenian villages were 
represented as a re-enactment of similar protective measures against the foreigners, including 
those against the Ottomans (Delo – Sobotna Priloga, 10/02/2001).  
One could perhaps expect that the perception of Slovenia as a transit-zone on the margins of 
Europe would foster the introduction of policy measures that would speed up the assessment 
of asylum applications and transform Slovenia into a country of destination rather than transit, 
thus bringing it closer to the other European states. Yet the reaction to the perception of 
Slovenia as a transit-zone was exactly the opposite: the amendments to the citizenship and 
immigration legislation introduced in 2000 and 2001 restricted the eligibility criteria for 
asylum applications and enhanced the control of state borders. These amendments can be seen 
as an institutionalisation of the symbolic position of Slovenia as a devoted guard of Europe’s 
borders. Since the undocumented immigrants were regularly presented as coming from ‘the 
East’, these amendments can be interpreted also as an institutionalisation of the symbolic 
border between Europe/ the West (and Slovenia as an aspiring member of the exclusive club) 
and parts of the globe recognized as ‘Eastern’. 
Throughout the year 2000, this position of Slovenia was presented as perfectly normal. The 
Slovenian border police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and most of the journalists reporting 
on their activities insisted that Slovenia had to meet the expectations of EU and perform the 
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role of the security belt as effectively as possible. Ensuring strict border-control on the future 
Schengen border was treated as one of the highest strategic priorities, and various border 
police activities were often explicitly presented as measures needed to protect Europe from 
immigration and boost Slovenia’s image in the eyes of the EU. For example, Rajko Komat, 
the director of the sector for foreigners and borders at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, argued: 
“If we want to come into Europe, we have to demonstrate that we are capable of protecting 
our borders successfully; therefore, we are paying a lot of attention to this problem” (Stop, 6 
Jan 2000). Furthermore, the representatives of the police would often proudly present their 
latest successes related to undocumented immigration, for example mixed border patrols 
organised together with the police from neighbouring countries (e.g. Daily News Bulletin, 
TVS1, 04/12/2000, 06/12/2000, and 24/01/2001; Delo, 16/01/2001). As a rule, journalists 
meticulously reported on such achievements, and also supported the above-sketched 
imagining of the relationship between Europe and Slovenia. Reports on the number of 
immigrants caught at the borders formed a regular feature of news bulletins and newspaper 
pages dedicated to crime. Especially cases when large groups of immigrants had been caught 
were presented as important achievements, and occasionally entered the cover pages or were 
listed as the news of the day at the beginning of news bulletins.  
 
‘Fortress Europe’ – an Excuse for the Introduction of Restrictive Policy Measures 
The willing acceptance of the role of the ‘border gendarme’ of Europe, however, did not last 
long, nor was it accepted by all the journalists and other individuals and groups involved in 
the public discussions about undocumented immigration. Especially from late January 2001 
onwards, even the representatives of various governmental bodies were less and less proud 
and self-confident when talking about Slovenia’s role in safeguarding European borders. The 
efforts of the border police were no longer treated as a matter of pride, but only as a part of 
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the price to be paid in order for Slovenia to qualify for EU membership. For example, the 
Minister of Internal Affairs, Rado Bohinc, stated that the standards that Europe had set for the 
candidate states were much higher than the ones it had set out for or complied with itself 
(Jana, 20/02/2001). Journalists and other individuals and groups participating in public debate 
occasionally voiced similar concerns. According to Jaroslav Jankovič, Western Europe was 
exerting “considerable pressure on the accession candidates to become a more efficient sieve 
for migratory currents”, and due to that, stopping illegal migration was becoming “one of the 
compulsory integration priorities” (Delo – Sobotna priloga, 18/12/2000). Vojislav Bercko, a 
journalist of Večer, was even more explicitly critical; in his view, Europe did not care about 
how and at what cost the candidate states were confronting the problem of migration; all that 
was important was that these states “protect the borders of the united Europe with all their 
forces” (12/08/2000).  
In some cases, the representation of Europe as a fortress that was reluctant to accept the 
immigrants would even be used as an argument in favour of the introduction of more 
restrictive policy measures. For example, Boris Jež, one of Delo’s journalists, argued: “The 
entire Europe defends itself from the refugees, and it is therefore not clear why exactly 
Slovenia should become a kind of oasis, a safe haven, with high social and cultural standards 
for the newcomers” (20/12/2000). Similarly, when addressing the issue of xenophobic and 
racist attitudes towards immigrants, journalists would often refer to xenophobic and racist 
incidents in the EU member states, thereby trying to rationalise similar incidents occurring in 
Slovenia (e.g. Tednik, TVS1, 15/02/2001).  
Evidently, what was at stake here was not whether being xenophobic is acceptable or not, but 
rather whether or not the Slovenians differ from the Europeans. Similarly as in the case of 
Bosnian refugees, the behaviour of the Europeans or the European institutions – however 
deplorable – was used as an excuse for the actions undertaken by the Slovenians or the 
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Slovenian institutions.  It is also important to note that when trying to account for xenophobia 
and the introduction of restrictive measures, Slovenia was again presented as an equal part of 
Europe – and not only as an abandoned buffer zone at its margins. Obviously, the symbolic 
positioning of Slovenia vis-à-vis Europe was malleable, and could be changed and 
appropriated to suit particular circumstances. 
Not everyone involved in the public discussion on undocumented immigration, however, 
shared these views. Unlike in the case of Bosnian refugees where the restrictive policies were, 
at least in 1992, successfully presented as uniquely democratic and did not provoke much 
explicit disapproval, the introduction of restrictive policy measures in the case of 
undocumented immigration was met with harsh criticism, mostly voiced by non-
governmental organisations. Nonetheless, even these criticisms often tended to represent 
Slovenian immigration policy as a consequence of the pressures exerted by the EU. In an 
open letter published in several Slovenian newspapers, the members of a non-governmental 
organisation, the Office for Interventions, claimed that the EU “has reserved for Slovenia the 
role of a sanitary cordon which should protect Europe from the throng of contemporary 
barbarians from the deprivileged world”. Obviously, argued the members of the Office, the 
state decided to solve the problem by instigating xenophobia, which would lead to the 
unification of ‘us’ against ‘them’ and would finally make it easier to blame ‘them’ for the 
government’s own incapability to solve the problems. Even this, however, suspected the 
members of the Office, might be a strategy which Slovenia had learned from the EU: “Has, 
perhaps, the Ministry for European Affairs brought this strategy from the training 
programmes organised for them by the European Union (EU), meant as help with the 
introduction of the Schengen standards on state borders here? Is spreading xenophobia 
inwards and grovelling before Brussels’ bureaucracy a recipe for solving the current state of 
affairs?” (Dnevnik, 19/12/2000).  
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Evidently, the members of the Office maintained that the actor responsible for the situation in 
Slovenia was, first and foremost, the EU – and the Slovenian authorities, as long as they 
blindly followed its instructions. Again, the main party to blame was not Slovenia or the 
Slovenian population itself, but the EU. Curiously, hardly anyone involved in the public 
discussion pointed out that the EU member states, however restrictive their policies may be, 
still accepted far more asylum seekers than Slovenia did (one such exception could be found 
in Nedelo, 09/02/2001). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The process of European integration and enlargement has fundamentally transformed the 
functioning of state borders between the member states, and had strong reverberations for the 
symbolic borders involved in the construction of collective identities. The internal borders of 
the EU have lost most of their traditional functions and become notoriously porous. The 
national identifications and borders, while still firmly in place, have become intertwined with 
attachments to the supra-national collective of Europeans. However, this weakening of 
borders within has gone hand in hand with a strengthening of external borders, and a drive to 
separate Europe and the Europeans from territories and populations perceived as not 
belonging to Europe.  
Predictably, this aspect of European integration has been most visible in member-states 
positioned on the margins of the EU. The transformation of borders, symbolic geographies 
and collective attachments in Slovenia examined in the paper is a case in point. Over the past 
twenty years, its northern and western borders, initially treated as a parts of the Iron Curtain, 
haves been transformed first into a regular international border and then into one of the 
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internal EU borders. Simultaneously, its southern border went from being an entirely porous, 
purely administrative internal border linking Slovenia with the fraternal Yugoslav republic of 
Croatia to functioning as a fully fledged international border and finally to being the external 
border of the EU. A parallel transformation has occurred at the level of symbolic geography: 
Slovenia was no longer seen as being a part of Yugoslavia, belonging neither to the West nor 
to the East, but was now positioned as a part of Europe/ the West, clearly distinct from 
territories beyond its southern and eastern borders. Finally, the attachment to a wider 
collective of South Slavs or Yugoslavs has been dropped and replaced by an attachment to the 
collective of Europeans.      
Besides providing an insight into these transformations, and particularly into the 
appropriations of the symbolic borders of Europe, the paper aimed to raise a more general 
point related to the study of borders. Since the state is not only a territorial organisation, but 
also a membership organisation, the institutional regulation of, and meanings attached to state 
borders are closely intertwined with the institutional regulation of, and meanings attached to 
citizenship and immigration. Due to that, state borders are far from being the sole institutional 
vehicle of the symbolic borders separating the Self from its Others. Policy measures 
regulating immigration function as an additional vehicle for these borders, and thus provide a 
complement to the institution of state borders: if the state border marks the perceived 
territorial borders of the Self, the immigration-related policy measures serve to maintain the 
perceived population borders distinguishing the Self from its Other(s).  
As demonstrated through the analysis of mass media representations of two major instances 
of immigration in Slovenia since 1990, the public framing of immigration was underpinned 
by assumptions closely corresponding with the symbolic positioning of Slovenia and the 
collective identifications of Slovenians as established with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. 
The immigrants were not perceived only as a threat to the national homogeneity of 
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Slovenians, but also as threat for Slovenia’s attachment to Europe. These assumptions were 
used to frame a number of policy measures designed to regulate immigration. Particularly the 
adoption of restrictive policy measures, including the prohibition of the free movement, the 
tightening of border controls, and even the closing of borders for immigration was largely 
legitimised by reference to Slovenia’s position vis-à-vis Europe. In the case of Bosnian war 
refugees in 1992, the fear of being lumped together with other formerly Yugoslav republics 
rather than being regarded as an equal member of Europe was so strong that it drew the 
political elites to support closing the borders for the refugees when it appeared that other 
European states were reluctant to open theirs. In the case of undocumented immigration in 
2000-2001, the introduction of restrictive measures was explained as a consequence of EU 
pressures, and seen as a prerequisite for boosting Slovenia’s popularity as a prospective 
member state. As such, the policy measures regulating immigration functioned as a 
complement to the Slovenian southern state borders, and served as additional institutional 
vehicles of the symbolic borders separating the Slovenian Self from its Others. If the state 
border served to institutionalise the perceived territorial border of the Slovenian Self, namely 
the border between Europe and the Balkans (or between the West and the East), the 
immigration-related policy measures served to institutionalise its perceived population border, 
namely the border separating the Balkan (or Eastern) population from the European (or 
Western) one.  
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